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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Gavin Lamar Mour appeals from the district court's order denying his 
motion to strike language from the order relinquishing jurisdiction. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
Following a traffic stop of a car in which Mour was the passenger, law 
enforcement discovered methamphetamine and paraphernalia. (R., pp.24-25.) 
Mour was arrested and the state charged him with concealment of evidence, 
possession of a controlled substance, and possession of drug paraphernalia. 
(R., pp.25-26, 32-34, 46-47.) Mour pied guilty to possession of a controlled 
substance, and the state dismissed the remaining charges. (R., pp.62-63, 70.) 
The court imposed a unified five-year sentence with two years fixed but 
suspended the sentence and placed Mour on probation. (R., pp.67, 71-75.) 
Ten months later, the state filed a Report of Probation Violation, the 
disposition of which resulted in the revocation of Mour's probation and the court 
retaining jurisdiction. (R., pp.122-124, 140-141.) At the jurisdictional review 
hearing, the court again placed Mour on probation. (R., pp.150-154.) Less than 
four months later, the state filed its second Report of Probation Violation. (R., 
pp.156-158.) After his second probation violation, the court revoked Mour's 
probation and retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.169-171.) 
Approximately two months in to the retained jurisdiction review period, 
Mour filed a motion asking the court to relinquish jurisdiction. (R., pp.180-183.) 
The court denied Mour's request. (R., p.185.) The court did, however, relinquish 
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jurisdiction two months later. (R., pp.185, 198-199.) The court's order 
relinquishing jurisdiction included the following language: 
THE IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION IS 
ENCOURAGED TO PROVIDE MR. MOUR WITH THE 
THERAPEUTIC COMMUNITY DURING THE SERVICE OF THE 
TERM OF HIS SENTENCE. HIS FEBRUARY 3, 2014 APSI 
INDICATES HE WILL BE GIVEN A "HIGH RISK PATHWAY" 
SINCE HIS LSI IS 42, THIS COURT REQUESTS AN OVERRIDE 
IF THAT IS THE CASE, REQUESTING THAT HE GET INTO THE 
THERAPEUTIC COMMUNITY. 
THE STATE OF IDAHO COMMISSION OF PARDONS AND 
PAROLE IS ENCOURAGED NOT TO CONSIDER MR. MOUR 
ELIGIBLE FOR PAROLE UNTIL HE HAS SUCCESSFULLY 
COMPLETED THE THERAPEUTIC COMMUNITY. 
(R., pp.198-99 (capitalization and underline original, bold omitted).) 1 
Mour filed a motion to strike the foregoing language from the order 
relinquishing jurisdiction. (R., pp.215-216.) The court denied Mour's motion. 
(Augmentation.2) Mour filed a timely notice of appeal. (Amended Notice of 
Appeal, filed May 28, 2014.) 
1 The court's order is attached as Appendix A. 
2 In his Appellant's Brief, Mour cites pages 215 and 216 of the Clerk's Record as 
the location of his motion to strike and the court's order denying his motion. 
(Appellant's Brief, p.3.) While that is an accurate citation for the motion, the 
order denying the motion was part of the "augmentation record." (Order 
Augmenting Record dated June 16, 2014.) 
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ISSUE 
Mour states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err in denying Mr. Mour's Motion to Strike 
Language from Order? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.4.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
In State v. Lee, 156 Idaho 444, 328 P.3d 424 (2014), the Idaho Supreme 
Court exercised its supervisory power to strike language, included in a judgment 
of acquittal, that it found to be superfluous editorializing. Should this Court 
decline Mour's invitation to exercise its supervisory power in this case to strike 
language from the district court's order relinquishing jurisdiction?3 
3 Because the issue involves the exercise of supervisory power, the state 
submits that this issue cannot be resolved by the Court of Appeals. 
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ARGUMENT 
Mour Has Failed To Show That This Court Should Exercise Its Supervisory 
Power To Strike Language From The District Court's Order Relinquishing 
Jurisdiction 
A. Introduction 
Mour contends the "district court improperly included unnecessary 
language in its order relinquishing jurisdiction" and erred in denying his motion to 
strike that language. (Appellant's Brief, p.5.) Mour is incorrect. Because the 
order relinquishing jurisdiction is not a judgment, I.C.R. 33(b) did not require the 
district court to grant Mour's motion to strike. Further, Mour has failed to identify 
any reasonable basis for this Court to extend its exercise of supervisory powers 
to strike language from district court orders. 
B. Idaho Criminal Rule 33(b) Did Not Require The District Court To Grant 
Mour's Motion To Strike And This Court Should Decline To Exercise Its 
Supervisory Power To Strike Any Of The Language In The District Court's 
Order Relinquishing Jurisdiction 
Idaho Criminal Rule 33(b), which governs criminal judgments, reads: 
The judgment of conviction shall set forth the plea, the 
verdict or findings, and the adjudication and sentence. If the 
defendant is found not guilty or for any other reason is entitled to 
be discharged, judgment shall be entered accordingly. The 
judgment shall be signed by the judge and entered by the clerk. 
Mour "acknowledges that the district court's order [relinquishing 
jurisdiction] was not a 'judgment of conviction' as typically contemplated," but 
claims it is "the functional equivalent following a district court's relinquishment of 
jurisdiction." (Appellant's Brief, p.5.) Mour, however, cites no authority for the 
proposition that an order relinquishing jurisdiction is the "functional equivalent" of 
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a criminal judgment or any authority that I.C.R. 33(b) governs anything other than 
criminal judgments. The plain language of the Rule 33(b) clearly indicates that it 
applies to "judgment[s] of conviction" and nothing in the rule suggests that it 
applies to other orders of the trial court. See State v. Knutsen, 138 Idaho 918, 
920, 71 P.3d 1065, 1067 (Ct. App. 2003) ("Where the language of a rule is plain 
and unambiguous, this Court must give effect to the rule as written, without 
engaging in statutory construction."). 
The only authority Mour cites, other than Rule 33(b), is the Idaho 
Supreme Court's recent opinion in Lee, supra, and the Idaho Court of Appeals 
opinion in State v. Starry, 130 Idaho 834, 948 P .2d 1133 (Ct. App. 1997). 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.5-6.) Neither case supports his claim of error. 
In Lee, the Court, exercising its supervisory power, held that the district 
court erred in denying Lee's motion to strike the following language from the 
judgment of acquittal: "Because he is a serious pedophile, it is hoped that the 
authorities will be able to keep a closer watch on him in the future." 156 Idaho at 
445, 328 P.3d at 425 (emphasis omitted). In so holding, the Court found the 
language "essentially amount[ed] to editorializing," "was not pertinent to the 
crime charged," and was not "necessary to indicate why the judgment of acquittal 
was being entered." !fl at 446, 328 P.3d at 426. The Court further stated: 
Id. 
While the district judge did not transgress any specific rules 
of this Court, the Court has endeavored to remove excess and 
unnecessary verbiage from judgments in the civil arena (I.R.C.P. 
54(a)), and they are no more desirable in the criminal arena. 
Judgments should be limited to stating the disposition of the case. 
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Lee illustrates two points relevant to this case, neither of which support 
Mour's claim of error. First, inclusion of "superfluous language," even in a 
judgment, does not "transgress any specific rules of th[e] [Supreme] Court." lfL. 
Thus, if superfluous language in a judgment does not violate I.C.R. 33(b), 
superfluous language in an order that is not a judgment, e.g., an order 
relinquishing jurisdiction, does not violate the rule. Second, the Court in Lee was 
addressing "unnecessary verbiage from judgments," id., not other district court 
orders. Extending Lee's application beyond judgments, as Mour advocates, 
invites review of any district court order that a defendant believes contains 
"superfluous" language. Surely the Idaho Supreme Court, in issuing Lee, did not 
contemplate such a far-reaching exercise of its supervisory authority. 
Starry, supra, also provides no support for Mour's claim. In Starry, the 
defendant filed a "petition to commute sentence," which the district court denied. 
130 Idaho at 835, 948 P.2d at 1134. On appeal, the Court of Appeals noted that 
the district court "ha[d] no authority to 'commute' a sentence once it ha[d] been 
imposed and executed" because "[s]uch authority is vested in the executive 
branch through the Board of Pardons, acting as the Commission of Pardons and 
Parole." lfL. The Court then re-characterized Starry's petition as an I.C.R. 35 
motion and held the district court had no jurisdiction to rule on its merits 
because, when viewed as a Rule 35 motion, the request was untimely. lfL. The 
Court advised Starry that any commutation request "is properly addressed to the 
Commission of Pardons and Parole." lfL. 
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Mour relies on Starry for the principle that '"[e]ncouraging' the parole 
board to refrain from granting [him] parole pending [sic] his completion of the 
Therapeutic Community was improper, unnecessary and arguably encroaches 
upon the authority vested in the executive branch through the Commission of 
Pardons and Parole." (Appellant's Brief, p.6.) This argument is without merit. 
Starry says nothing about the propriety of making recommendations to the Idaho 
Department of Correction or "encouraging" a particular course of action, much 
less hold that doing so would be "improper," "unnecessary," or constitute 
"encroach[ing]" on the authority of Commission of Pardons and Parole. Indeed, 
any argument that a district court cannot make recommendations to the 
Department of Correction without violating the separation of powers is not only 
unsupported by any legal authority, it is also unsupported by logic or reason. As 
noted by the district court in denying Mour's motion to strike, the executive 
branch is not bound by the recommendations; rather, the court's comments 
reflect its "well-informed recommendation," based on its experience with Mour, 
the court's "best thoughts on how to best protect the public by best rehabilitating 
Mr. Mour." (5/8/2014 Tr., p.6, Ls.8-9, 20-23.) Communication between branches 
of government does not violate separation of powers. Compare State v. Easley, 
156 Idaho 214, 322 P.3d 296 (2014). It does not even amount to bad 
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policy. Mour has offered no basis for concluding otherwise.4 
Mour has failed to show the district court's order denying his motion to 
strike violates any rule and he has failed to articulate any reason this Court 
should exercise its supervisory power to strike language from the district court's 
order relinquishing jurisdiction. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
order denying Mour's motion to strike. 
DATED this 23 rd day of December 2014. 
!OtuU1c-
JESSICA M. LORELLO 
~~ty Attorney General 
4 Mour also does not mention, much less discuss, the district court's reasons for 
denying his motion to strike. (Appellant's Brief, pp.3, 5-6.) 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 23rd day of December 2014, served a 
true and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a 
copy addressed to: 
ERIC FREDERICKSEN 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the 
Idaho Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
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JE9Sl~A M. LORELLO 
De~ Attorney General 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
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STATE OF IDAHO, } 
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vs. ) 
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DISPOSITION AND NOTICE 
SSN: 
. !DOC: 85306 
OF RIGHT TO APPEAL 
) 
Defendant. } 
This ORDER RELINQUISHING JURISDICTION constitutes the retained 
jurisdiction disposition in the above matter. 
On February 13, 2014, before the Honorable John T. Mitchell, District Judge, you, 
GAVIN LAMAR MOUR, personally appeared for disposition of your retained jurisdiction. 
Also appearing were a lawyer from the Office of the KOOTENAI County Prosecuting 
Attorney and your lawyer, Lynn Nelson. 
Whereupon the court considered the report of the jurisdiction review committee and 
any offered evidence, and the defendant having been given the opportunity to explain, or 
comrryent concerning disposition, and you having been given the opportunity to make a 
statement and having done so, and recommendations having been made by counsel for 
the State and by your lawyer, the Court did then pronounce disposition as follows: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that, pursuant to J.C. §§19-2601, the court's 
retained jurisdiction is relinquished and your sentence is imposed as follows: 
POSSESSION OF A 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE 
(METHAMPHETAMINE) 
To the custody of the State of Idaho Board of 
correction for a fixed term of TWO (2) years followed 
by an indeterminate term of THREE (3) years for a 
total unified sentence of FIVE (5) years. 
THE IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION IS ENCOURAGED TO PROVIDE 
Gavin Lamar Mour 41788 
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MR. MOUR WITH THE THERAPEUTIC COMMUNITY DURING THE SERVICE 
OF THE TERM OF HIS SENTENCE. HIS FEBRUARY 3, 2014 APSI INDICATES 
HE WILL BE GIVEN A "HIGH RISK PATHWAY" SINCE HIS LSI IS 42, THIS 
COURT REQUESTS AN OVERRIDE IF THAT IS THE CASE, REQUESTING 
THAT HE GET INTO THE THERAPEUTIC COMMUNITY. 
THE STATE OF IDAHO COMMISSION OF PARDONS AND PAROLE IS 
ENCOURAGED NOT TO CONSIDER MR. MOUR ELIGIBLE FOR PAROLE UNTIL 
HE HAS SUCCESSFULLY COMPL TED THE THERAPEUTIC COMMUNITY. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to Idaho Code § 18-309 you, GAVIN 
LAMAR MOUR, shall be given credit for time served on any sentence imposed on the 
above charges as follows: CRF 2010 23839- 240 days. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the issue of reimbursement of $3,987.11, to 
Kootenai County for the costs associated with extraditing you from the State of California, 
will be left open for 90 days, but the Court will enter an order for that amount without an 
additional hearing, if those costs are itemized. 
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL 
YOU, GAVIN LAMAR MOUR, ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that you have a right to 
appeal this order to the Idaho Supreme Court. Any notice of appeal must be filed within 
forty-two (42) days of the entry of the written order in this matter. 
YOU ARE FURTHER NOTIFIED that if you are unable to pay the costs of an 
appeal, you have the right to apply for leave to appeal in forma pauperis or to apply for 
the appointment of counsel at public expense. If you have questions concerning your 
right to appeal, you should consult your present lawyer. 
DATED this 13 TH day of February, 2014. 
CERTIFICATE 0 
I hereby certify that on the / 3 day of February, 2014 copies oft fore ing Order were mailed, postage prepaid, 
or sent by facsimile or interoffice mail to: 
/4~fense Attorney· Lynn Nelson ~ 
..:::::::· Prosecuting Attorney - CITY OF CDA ANN 
ECKHART, SPEC. DEP. PROS. '7 (? '/~;,3':>k 
~robation& Parole~ 
V'Community Service ~i,te, office Mail} ..Qr.~ 
_ KOOTENAI County Auditor (Interoffice Mail) 
~OOTENAI County Sheriff~-
.....(fdaho Department of Correction E:,.Q1\Q..L.ll....., 
(eeRifiid aepy faued t"O ('208~ 32'7 i',4,4;9J' 
_ !DOC CCD, fax (208) 658-2186 
:%-J(t?d) ;~·/'\ ~ 
_ !DOC, CCD, !DOC DIST 1 : Dist1@idoc.idaho.gov; Ccdsentencingd!@idoc.idaho.gov; centralrecords@idoc.idaho.gov 
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